This paper discusses the spatial dynamics in the Le Havre -Hamburg range. By applying existing spatial models on port system development, changes in the range's port hierarchy are discussed. It is demonstrated that the existing port hierarchy in the range is unlikely to be structurally challenged in the foreseeable future and that port authorities and market players are designing strategies in view of better meeting the market requirements in terms of port services provision, logistics integration and hinterland penetration.
Introduction
With a total maritime container throughput of 34.6 mio. TEU (twenty-foot equivalent unit) 1 handled along a shoreline of merely 500 nautical miles, the Le Havre-Hamburg range ranks among the busiest and most competitive container regions in the world (Tab. 1, Fig. 1 ). The ports in the Le Havre-Hamburg range are gateway ports serving extended shared hinterlands. But yet, the range can not to be considered as a homogenous set of container ports. It features established large container load centers such as Rotterdam, Antwerp, Hamburg, Bremerhaven and Le Havre, as well as a whole series of medium-sized to smaller ports each with specific characteristics in terms of hinterland markets served, commodities handled and location qualities. The unique blend of different port types and sizes combined with a vast economic hinterland shapes port competition in the region.
Container port competition in general and in the Le Havre -Hamburg range in particular is highly complex and dynamic. Analyzing the object of competition, the players involved and the way port authorities are dealing with competitive challenges is not an easy task. The organizational and institutional environment in which the gateway ports operate has changed dramatically in the last decennia. World Trade Organization's (WTO) impact on free trade, deregulation and privatization in ports and inland transportation are among the main institutional factors affecting port hierarchy. Logistics integration, scale increases in vessel size, the emergence of global terminal operators and structural changes in logistics and distribution networks are just some of the key organizational trends affecting port operations and spatial characteristics within the Le Havre -Hamburg range. These developments have not only made port competition more intense, but have even affected the core object of port competition. The load centers in the range are designing appropriate strategies to respond to these new challenges. This paper discusses the spatial dynamics in the Le Havre -Hamburg range. More in particular, it seeks answers to the questions: how did port hierarchy in the range evolve in the past and is this expected to be structurally challenged in the future? The first section of the paper discusses past and present port hierarchy in the range in light of existing models on port system development. The second section deals with the expected future development of port hierarchy and spatial dynamics in the range. Both supply factors (i.e. terminal capacities) as well as demand factors (i.e. organizational/institutional factors such as logistics integration, terminalization of port operations, liner shipping networks, hinterland networks, stakeholder relations management in port planning, etc..) are taken into consideration.
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Spatial dynamics in the container load centers of the Le Havre-Hamburg range
Spatial dynamics and changing port hierarchy in the range
Most theoretical models on gateway port system development suggest that large ports, which invested early in container infrastructure, attract more and more container traffic. The resulting port concentration can cause degradation of minor ports in the network (see e.g. BIRD 1970) . The spatial models of HAYUTH (1981) and BARKE (1986) refer to a deconcentration tendency caused by the growth of former non-hub ports and the emergence of new ports. A distinction should be made between deconcentration within a port and deconcentration within a port system. The first type basically refers to the infrastructural extension of port areas away from the historical core to less urban downstream sites. Scale expansion in shipping and the use of new transhipment technologies are some of the factors that have resulted in the abandoning of older port sites. The second type, i.e. deconcentration within a port system, occurs when some of the cargo is shifted from large ports to neighboring smaller or new ports, or when the large load centers only absorb a small portion of the container growth in the port system. HAYUTH (1981) calls this phenomenon the peripheral port challenge (see also NOTTEBOOM 2005) . He argues that as the port system develops, diseconomies of scale in some large load centers emerge in the form of a lack of space for expansion and port congestion. This encourages smaller ports or even new ports to attract cargo. The peripheral port challenge concept thus implies that those ports which existed before the container revolution and invested early in the new technology are gradually losing market share to new or upgraded ports which try to gain load center status.
Cargo concentration in the range
Given the above conceptual considerations on port system development, it is interesting to address concentration patterns and changing port hierarchies in the Le Havre-Hamburg. Rotterdam, Hamburg, Antwerp, Bremerhaven and Le Havre have always been and still are the main container load centers in the region see. Their joint market share in the total container throughput of the range evolved from 90 % in the late seventies to 95 % in the last two decennia. Rotterdam's market share in the range had fluctuated between 35 % and 40 % since the late seventies, but fell sharply in the new mil- 
Net shift analysis applied to the Le Havre-Hamburg range
It is useful to examine the volume of container shifts among ports in order to get a more detailed insight in throughput dynamics. The net shift analysis provides a good tool for measuring container shifts. The net shift reflects the total TEU an individual port or a port group has actually lost to or won from competing units. A net shift of zero would mean that the port or port group would have the same growth rate as the total seaport system. Additional relevant information can be obtained by calculating the net volume of containers shifted between individual ports and port groups. Periods characterized by high net volume shifts refer to a considerable degree of dynamics and competition within the container port system. (F)  38  63  71  71  71  149  161  200  205  206  Rouen (F)  14  98  135  93  120  146  144  139  161  165  Amsterdam (NL)  32  72  79  69  91  53  45  52  66  304  Flushing (NL)  28  83  35  26  6  3  9  27  39  40  Cuxhaven (D)  0  0  0  3  16  24  27  36  35  40  Gent (B)  10  10  10  10  6  10  21  35  31  35  Ostend (B)  0  0  0  0  0  0  9  15  9  6  Wilhelmshaven (D) 0  0  0  0  6  29  41  43  3  5  Emden (D)  0  0  0  0  0  57  69  1  0  1   Total 2,612 5,125 7,158 9,811 13,338 20,257 22,856 28,713 31,655 34,606 On the basis of Tab. 2 a few conclusions can be put forward. In recent years, port competition in the Le Havre-Hamburg range has increased considerably in absolute terms (see NET SHIFTtotal). In relative terms the net container shifts between ports in the range fluctuated between 1 % and 2.75 %. In the last two observation periods, the net shifts between ports in different countries represented between 55 % and 68 % of the total net shifts in the range (see NET SHIFTinter). The remainder relates to competition between ports within the same country (e.g. Bremerhaven versus Hamburg). The figures for the individual ports confirm that Hamburg in particular is among the main winners in terms of net shifts. More detail on the net container shifts between port groups of different countries is given in Fig.2 . Since the end of the nineties, the net volumes shifted between national container port groups fluctuate between 250,000 and 300,000 TEU.
In the last period of observation, the Dutch container ports were able to reverse the negative trend that could be observed in the two earlier periods. After a long history of rather neutral development (i.e. net volume shifts near to zero), German load centers significantly improved their competitive position in the last ten years. In general, the position of the French ports in the Hamburg-Le Havre range deteriorated the most, with a negative shift effect (or missed growth) in the last observation period of nearly 200,000 TEU.
Given increasing requirements on maritime accessibility for the ever large container vessels and the minimization of diversion distances for these vessels, one could expect that coastal ports are gaining market share at the expense of upstream ports (see e.g. BAIRD 1996) The newest plan encompasses the construction of the CT IV terminal (four berths totalling 1,700 m). This will raise the port's annual capacity to 5.6 mio.TEU. These examples make clear that the large load centers in the area have responded in an adequate way to carriers' demand for new large terminal capacity.
In the previous section it was demonstrated that up to now none of the small and mediumsized ports have been able to challenge the large load centers. The new requirements related to deep-sea services (e.g. good maritime and inland accessibility, availability of terminal and back-up land and short vessel turnaround times) do not necessarily make the existing large container ports the best locations for setting up hub operations. As such, it is not unlikely the future position of the large load centers can be to some extent threatened by medium-sized coastal ports and new hub terminals. Hence, the container growth potential in the range and potential diseconomies of scale in the existing load centers (e.g. in the form of lack of space for further expansion) have attracted non-hub ports into the container business. The new coastal ports could also partly be an answer to the restricted maritime accessibility and high diversion distance of Antwerp and Hamburg and the ongoing debates on the further deepening of the rivers Scheldt and Elbe respectively. 1996; NOTTEBOOM et al. 1997 ).
Based on the above analysis of future terminal supply, it is likely that cargo concentration levels in the Hamburg-Le Havre range will slightly decrease in the years to come stimulated by a number of seaports entering the large-scale container handling market and by a further narrowing of the throughput gap between Rotterdam and the main competitors. However, the supplyoriented analysis does not point to structural shocks in the range's existing port hierarchy.
The demand side: the changing face of port competition
Providing terminal capacity is one issue, filling them is another. There are several organizational and institutional driving forces at the demand side that could lead to spatial and structural changes in the port hierarchy. These forces are related to the changing face of port competition in the region. This section deals with key factors related to the dynamic nature of port competition in the region. In the last years, the traditional "blue banana" approaches the shape of a boomerang as a result of extensions to Central and Eastern Europe and significant investments in the Mediterranean (Spain in particular). Northern ports, in particular Hamburg, are benefiting the most from the last round of EU enlargement, whereas new development opportunities might arise for secondary port systems in the Adriatic and the Baltic Sea. An increasing number of ports gain direct hinterland access to the "blue banana" area. On the one hand, this development has broadened container port competition and altered spatial hierarchy, in the sense that the load centers in the Hamburg -Le Havre range are increasingly facing competition from container ports in other European port ranges (Baltic, Adriatic and Mediterranean), primarily for serving hinterland regions in the periphery of the core of the EU. On the other hand, the rise of economic centers in Eastern and Central Europe creates opportunities for the Le Havre -Hamburg range to develop shortsea shipping services and water-and land-based hub-feeder networks to these areas.
The tendency towards intense competition for shared hinterlands is enhanced by the development of intermodal corridors and inland terminals. By developing strong functional links with particular inland terminals a port might intrude in the natural hinterland of competing ports. "Islands" in the distant hinterland are created in which the load center achieves a comparative cost and service advantage vis-à-vis rival seaports (see NOTTEBOOM/RODRIGUE 2005 for more on "island" formation). The spatial impact of "island" formation is profound: the distance to a specific hinterland region as such becomes less dominant in explaining a port's competitive position with respect to serving that specific hinterland region. Instead, corridor formation seems to have a larger impact in explaining ports' positions vis-à-vis shared hinterlands.
The modal split in a number of European load centers is summarized in Tab The configuration of barge and rail networks proofs to be a crucial organizational element for the future spatial hierarchy in the Le Havre -Hamburg range. First of all, market players have identified inland logistics as one of the most vital area still left to cut costs. More economical ships and alliance co-operation have lowered ship system costs, but at the same time intermodal costs share an increasing part of the total cost. We can speak of a shift of balance from vessel costs to landside costs, favoring load centers with an upstream location close to the main production and consumption markets. This element partly explains why upstream ports are still in the picture, despite scale increases in vessel size and the associated demand for minimum diversion distances.
Secondly, barge container transport has an influence on competitive relationships within the European container port system. It enables the large Benelux ports in particular to create a patchwork of overlapping areas served by individual inland terminals, within which it is possible to achieve a cost advantage over other European container ports. The huge scale of barge operations in Rotterdam and Antwerp generates advantages not found in smaller container ports. The organizational advantages are apparent in the clustering of barge operators and related companies (e.g. ship repairs and ship chandlers). Other load centers including new ones are seeking to give inland barging a more prominent place in their inland distribution patterns of maritime containers, but the existing port hierarchy vis-à-vis Antwerp and Rotterdam is unlikely to be challenged in this respect.
Thirdly, the hinterland connections of smaller ports and new load centers in a start-up phase remain rather precarious. In the past, lines of major penetration emanating from the large load centers have allowed large ports to capture the hinterlands of neighboring smaller ports. Smaller ports and new terminals find themselves confronted with a vicious circle in the organization of hinterland transportation. The small-scale container volumes do not allow to install frequent block and shuttle trains to the more distant hinterlands. Because of the inability to serve a substantial hinterland, the major shipping lines do not include these ports in their liner services. The only way for smaller container ports to escape this vicious circle is by seeking connection to the extensive hinterland networks of the large load centers through the installation of shuttle services either (a) to rail platforms in the big container ports or (b) to master rail hubs in the hinterland. The hub-feeder hierarchy in case (a) further strengthens the competitive position of the large load centers. Situation (b) demands the availability of rail hubs in the immediate or more distant hinterland. The use of inland hubs by small and large ports of the same port cluster could strengthen a trend towards a certain degree of deconcentration in the port system. Numerous hub-and-spoke railway networks have indeed emerged in the nineties, thereby allowing higher service frequencies and the inclusion of smaller container ports in the network (e.g. the Qualitynet of Intercontainer-Interfrigo (ICF) with hub Metz-Sablon in the North-east of France). However, European rail liberalization has partly contributed to the recent decline of many of the hub-and-spoke networks. New railway operators often engage in cherry picking by introducing competing direct shuttle trains on a spoke of an established hub-and-spoke network of a competitor. This organizational dimension in the rail industry has a clear spatial impact: it creates a negative affect on cargo volumes on the spoke and might lead to a collapse of the whole hub-andspoke system. For example, both ICF's (Intercontainer-Interfrigo) Qualitynet and IFB's (Inter Ferry Boats) North European Network (NEN) stopped operations in 2004. The rail operators involved shifted operations to a system of direct shuttle trains out of the main load centers. A further decline of hub-and-spoke rail networks in Europe could seriously affect the future growth potential of smaller and new ports as they would remain confronted with the vicious circle effect.
Port competition and logistics chains: Seaports increasingly have to deal with large port clients who possess a strong bargaining power vis-à-vis terminal operations and inland transport operations. The integration strategies of the market players created an environment in which ports are increasingly competing not as individual places that handle ships but within transport chains or supply chains. In the contemporary logistic-restructured port environment it has become more difficult to identify the port customers who really exert power in the logistic chain or who are driving port selection. Market players are sometimes port user and port service supplier at the same time (e.g. a shipping line operating a dedicated terminal). In some cases, the chain manager is situated at the end of the chain. For instance, supermarket chains like Carrefour exert strong power on the supply lines of food products. In these high volume logistics chains, a seaport is seen as a bundling point, a buffer within the scope of inventory management and or a fast transit point. In other logistics chains, commodity traders have a large impact on the routing of cargo. Large forwarding agencies negotiate rates with shipping lines and route the cargo they manage according to a combination of determinants such as price, transit time and reliability. The question who really decides which port to choose, typically depends on factors such as the type of cargo involved, the cargo generating power of the shipper, the characteristics related to specific trade routes and the terms of trade and terms of sale.
The above observations of an organizational nature have a large impact on spatial dynamics and port competition in the range. More than ever, terminals are not an end in itself: Efficient cargo handling facilities contribute to the industrial and logistics development in the port area and the hinterland. As the loyalty of port clients cannot be taken for granted, load centers in the Le Havre -Hamburg range are striving to approach some shippers and carriers who control huge cargo flows and who are in a good position to generate value-added for the port region. Success is being more and more determined by the ability of the port community to fully exploit synergies with other transport nodes and other players within the logistics networks of which they are part. This observation demands closer co-ordination with logistics actors outside the port perimeter and a more integrated approach to port infrastructure planning and concession policy. In co-operation with other parties involved port authorities can actively stimulate the spatial and logistics development of port areas through the enhancement of flexible labor conditions, smooth customs formalities (in combination with freeport status) and powerful information systems. The changing logistics environment also poses new challenges in the spatial relations between seaports and inland ports. A large number of port authorities promote an efficient intermodal system in order to secure cargo under conditions of high competition. This includes for example the involvement in the introduction of new shuttle train services to the hinterland, together with the respective national railway companies, rail operators, terminal operators, shipping companies and/or large shippers.
To reflect changes in port-hinterland dynamics as a result of logistics dynamics, NOTTE-BOOM/RODRIGUE (2005) introduced a regionalization phase in port and port system development. Regionalization expands the hinterland reach of the port through a number of strategies linking it more closely to inland freight distribution centers. The phase of regionalization brings the perspective of port development to a higher geographical scale, i.e. beyond the port perimeter. The port regionalization phase is characterized by a strong functional interdependency and even joint development of a specific load center and (selected) multimodal logistics platforms in its hinterland, ultimately leading to the formation of a "regional load center network". The port system consequently adapts to the imperatives of distribution systems.
All ports in the Le Havre -Hamburg range have to some extent embraced the idea of port regionalization. However, some ports like Antwerp for a long time stayed at the sideline when it came to inland terminal developments and the creation of logistics zones along hinterland corridors, while other ports such as Rotterdam were more active in this field. In practice, mainly private market players are involved in setting up these types of cooperative networks. Port authorities are often quite reluctant to engaging in advanced forms of strategic partnerships with inland ports, e.g. through strategic alliances, (cross-) participation, joint-ventures or even mergers and acquisitions. Port managers fear to losing added value and employment by 'giving away' activities, to losing captive cargo (port related companies in the hinterland are less dependent on one port for their maritime import and export) and to losing clients as these might consider the cooperation with one specific hinterland location as a market restriction or distortion. More room has been created for forms of indirect co-operation, for example through joint marketing and promotion, which are less binding and require less financial means.
Large load centers generally have a broad financial base to engage in a well-balanced port networking strategy, although substantial differences exist even among the largest container ports. Smaller ports and new ports have to rely solely on very simple co-ordination actions to substantially improve inland freight distribution, with benefits for all parties involved. In spatial terms this implies that regional load center networks are most likely to be developed around large load centers, whereas smaller ports either become part of these large regional load center networks or remain isolated in a spatial and organizational sense.
The 'terminalization' of port competition: In the last ten years, the container handling industry in the Le Havre -Hamburg range has been characterized by massive consolidation, vertical integration and the formation of terminal networks operated by international stevedoring groups (NOTTEBOOM 2002; MUSSO et al., 2001 Shipping Consultants 2003) . In light of vertical integration strategies, shipping lines have entered the container handling market via the development of dedicated terminals at major load centers. Many of these liner terminals offer stevedoring services to third carriers as well thereby creating some hybrid form in between pure dedicated facilities and independently operated multi-user facilities. MUSSO et al. (2001) , BRENNAN (2002) and CARIOU (2003) provide a more in-depth analysis on the issue of dedicated terminals.
The organizational consolidation in the container handling industry has a large impact on the spatial dynamics in the range.
First of all, competition is shifting form port authorities to private terminal operators who are trying to establish terminal networks. SLACK (2005) rightly referred to the "terminalization" of port competition in this respect. The spatial implications are far reaching. Instead of port competition between clearly-defined port areas with spatial boundaries (nodes), competitive forces are shifted to groups of spatially-dispersed but functionally-integrated terminals in different ports (networks).
Secondly, the large terminal operators are becoming more footloose in spatial terms as the network approach loosens their former strong ties with one particular seaport. In many cases, global terminal operators in upstream ports have extended their operations to mediumsized or new coastal container ports in order to offer the customers a more differentiated product range. Carriers have the choice between a call at a coastal port with onward inland services to the large load center, or a direct call in the large load center. The extensive terminal networks are often considered as an effective means to counterbalance the power of carrier combinations in liner shipping, to realize economies of scale and to optimize the terminal function within logistics networks. At the same time, however, the industry structure has become sufficiently concentrated to raise questions about whether market forces are sufficient to prevent the abuse of market power.
Thirdly, the influx of overseas capital in seaports together with the consolidation in the cargo handling business have created circumstances in which some stevedoring companies have acquired a very strategic position in a port's future. A large number of European ports are now confronted with one or two terminal operators within the port area. The key position of such terminal operators inevitably attracts a lot of attention of the local port community, as they want to secure that economic rents of these terminal operations stay local. There is also a spatial implication in the sense that inter-terminal linkages within a port area have become a crucial issue to the dominant terminal operator in that specific port.
Port competition and the community: Securing terminal capacity and land infrastructure within a reasonable timeframe has become a major competitive factor in the Le Havre -Hamburg range. The time needed to develop port and inland infrastructure has increased considerably in the last decades because of painstaking legal procedures and the broad involvement of stakeholders in the planning process. It took the port of Antwerp ten years between the first plans and the first operations at the new Deurganckdock. A first broad discussion on Maasvlakte II in Rotterdam took place in the mid nineties, while the first terminal is expected to become operational only in 2013/14.
The economic value of a port development project now tends to be taken as given, so the argument concentrates on the environmental criteria (e.g. dredging and dredge disposal, loss of wetlands, emissions into the air, water pollution, congestion, loss of open space, light and noise externalities, potential conflicts with commercial fishing and recreational uses of area waters). Port authorities and port companies must demonstrate a high level of environmental performance in order to ensure community support. However, environmental aspects also play an increasing role in attracting trading partners and potential investors. A port with a strong environmental record and a high level of community support is likely to be favored. This observation can potentially have an impact on the future port hierarchy in the Le Havre -Hamburg range. In the last decade, ports in the Le Havre -Hamburg range have had to go through "learning by doing"-experiences in developing stakeholders relations management and in dealing the best they can with EU and national environmental regulations and spatial planning restrictions.
The discussed institutional factors in port development have spatial implications for the port hierarchy. Larger load centers have a richer experience in dealing with these issues. Newcomers in the container market or smaller ports might have less experience, which might show to cause serious delays or even a halt to any large terminal development. The ongoing (long) debate on the Westerscheldt Container Terminal in Flushing serves as an example. As such, large load centers have a good starting position to further consolidate their position in the spatial hierarchy within the Le Havre -Hamburg range.
Conclusions
Ports are confronted with ever changing organizational and institutional factors in economic and logistics systems. The global market place, with powerful and relatively footloose players, extensive business networks and complex logistics systems, have a dramatic impact on the raison d'être of seaports. The tendency towards logistics integration in the port and maritime industry and the impact of changes in logistics on the functional role of ports in value chains are well documented in literature. ROBINSON (2002) placed the role of seaports within a new paradigm of ports as elements in value-driven chain systems, while MARTIN/ THOMAS (2001) addressed structural changes in the container terminal community.
Despite these dramatic changes in the organizational and institutional environment of ports in the Le Havre -Hamburg range, port hierarchy in the last 30 years remained rather unchanged and no structural shifts in the spatial characteristics could be observed. The five large load centers keep on dominating the market in spatial terms, with upstream ports slightly improving their market share and French ports losing some market share. The share of small and medium-sized ports remains small.
The supply-based analysis demonstrated cargo concentration levels in the Hamburg -Le Havre range might slightly decrease in the years to come because of a number of seaports entering the large-scale container handling market and because of a further narrowing of the throughput gap between Rotterdam and the main competitors. But no structural shifts in the range's existing port hierarchy are expected.
The demand factors discussed in this paper indicate container port competition in the Le Havre -Hamburg range will remain highly complex and dynamic. Port rivalry will most likely become more intense, and even the core object of port competition will further shifts towards the accommodation of logistics chains for which terminals are merely a node. The large load centers in the range are designing appropriate strategies to respond to these new challenges and in more than one case this includes a trend towards port regionalization incorporating inland terminals and corridors.
Smaller container ports will face a difficult time in challenging the established large load centers. New entrants in the container handling market typically meet the requirements for maritime accessibility and terminal layout, and might be well positioned for accommodating a part of the sea-sea transshipment flows, particularly in relation to the Asian trade. However, they will have to tackle major issues including the vicious cycle in hinterland networks, their general lack of experience in stakeholder-related procedures linked to large terminal projects and their lower cargo-generating and cargo-binding potential (typically as a result of a lack of associated forwarders' and agents' networks).
Due to the above organizational and institutional factors, it is unlikely that the spatial hierarchy in the Le Havre -Hamburg range will structurally alter in the foreseeable future. Inter-port networking could reach new heights in the years to come in the framework of the port regionalization phase, but this is not expected to result in a far reaching revision of the existing port hierarchy. 
Note

